Abstract
Introduction
The term Corporate Governance was barely presented before the decade of 90's, although unclassified and non-scientifically proved evidence exist since the date of Adam Smith. Unfortunately, the usage of Corporate Governance did not follow the rapid research of the concept of Corporate Governance. It can be characterized as a system of principles, which are concerned about the management and the administration of organizations. Through Corporate Governance organizations can be more efficiently governing, transparent, and can control the actions as well as the proceedings of managers.
However, there is not a convergence of thoughts between various researchers as far as the exact interpretation of this concept. Keasey and Wright (1993) think Corporate Governance as "the system of principles that includes the structures, the approached, the values, and the systems, which contribute to the successful management of organizations". Keasey, Thompson and Wright (1997) consider that Corporate Governance contains the wide system of formal and informal connections that are related with the organization as well as their consequences for the society. Another more general approach is that of Mayer (1988) . According to the researcher, "Corporate Governance is concerned about the ways through which the interests of managers and investors can be reconciled in order organizations to operate in favor of investors".
Many facts and conditions have driven to an increased demand for good Corporate Governance. The springs of this demand were various negative acts, which hit the business world. Examples of these acts are: creative accounting, managers who service only their own interests and go against investors' interests, weakness of auditors to control and report companies efficiently (for example, Enron scandal), enormous compensations for managers that in some cases threatened the company's performance, policies of some investors for easy money etc. The representative examples of organizations' collapses give reasons to strongly believe that firm value is not exclusively depended on profitability ratios or/and growth prospects, but also on the quality of the control mechanisms, which ensure that organizations are wellmanaged as well as investors' wealth is increased. Finally, this situation led to the presentation and establishment of management and administration principles named Corporate Governance.
Tightened rules and regulations and the adoption of the codes (Cadbury Report, Greenbury Report) are the result which derives from the fact that better Corporate Governance will deliver higher shareholder value. In favor of this aspect, McKinsey and Company (2000) found that institutional investors are willing to pay significant premiums for companies that are well governed and that the valuation of a firm depends not only on financial issues but also on Corporate Governance. Moreover, Under these assumptions, the more qualitative the implementation of Corporate Governance is, the less rate of return is required for investors in order to monitor managers and the less is the cost of capital (Lombardo and Pagano, 2000) . Only if we approach Corporate Governance with various models can we reveal the relation between the quality level of Corporate Governance implementation and various expressions and approximations of expected returns. Actually, we conclude that Corporate Governance does not contribute to the creation of excess returns nor is it a factor that contributes to their alteration. Also, Corporate Governance is not a risk factor that investors of Athens Stock Exchange (henceforth ASE) take into deep consideration.
It is noticeable the fact that governance codes are not compulsory regulations for any kind of company in Greece as it is in Germany with the "German Corporate Governance Code" (Drobetz et al., 2004) . Thus, Corporate Governance is not viewed as an obligation but rather as a chance for changing.
The remainder is as follows. Section 2 cites the model through which we will test Corporate Governance as a risk factor. Section 3 contains the construction of the Corporate Governance Quality Level (CGQL) and variance analyses between CGQL and Financial Measures plus Valuation Ratios. Section 4 explores the factors, which create as well as shift returns. Section 5 presents the relationship between CGQL and expected return on equity. Section 6 concludes. At this point, we are confined in the creation of some basic assumptions, which are going to be tested at a posterior section. Firstly, quality level of Corporate Governance must be a measurable variable. We develop the control variable named "Corporate Governance Quality Level" (CGQL) as an appropriate measure-proxy of quality implementation of Corporate Governance for every sample firm. This will help us in measuring the relation between Corporate Governance and the expected rate of return on equity. The quantification of the CGQL, which is a quality variable, is presented in the next section.
In a first step, we try to discover any relationship between Corporate Governance and firm value as well as correlation with historical returns. Following partially previous researches (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2002; Black, Jang and Kim, 2003; Drobetz et al., 2004; Thalassinos and Zampeta, 2012; Havlíček, Břečková and Zampeta, 2013; Břečková and Havlíček, 2013) , we relate CGQL with firm value as it is measured by the book-to-market ratio and market capitalization in a univariate analysis. Our hypothesis is that we will be in line with the results of the majority of researchers and find a significant relationship. However, while some studies apply the technique of the two-stage least square regression (Drobetz et al., 2004) , we are going to seek whether good quality of Corporate Governance causes increased returns and firm value using the Ordinary Least Squares Method (O.L.S.).
In a second step, our aim is to estimate whether expected returns are explained (at least) merely by the coefficient of RMRF (variable of the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) ) or/and they are related with another factor too, named "governance risk".
To start with, bear in mind that CAPM implies a linear relationship between expected returns and market betas. Beta is regarded as the factor, which completely explains the cross-section of expected returns. Following the rationale of MacBeth (1973) Lombardo (2000) , Lombardo and Pagano (2000) , as well as Drobetz et al. (2004) we relate expected returns not only with betas but also with an additional risk measure, which is the quality level of Corporate Governance. Using this method, we are able to confirm or to contradict the hypothesis that not only beta -that is the quotient with covariance for numerator and variance of the returns of the market for denominator -but also CGQL are factors, which completely describe the cross-sectional variation in expected returns. CGQL is the factor with elements corresponding to the "Corporate Governance Quality Level". In addition to the above, the equation that will reveal if not only market betas but also the quality of firms' Corporate Governance performs in the mutation of expected returns is: Many researchers have already worked on the selection of these proxies. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) adopt 24 factors (or International Responsibility Research Center/IRRC provisions), which are comprised into four categories, constructing their "G-Index". Brown and Caylor (2004) take into account 51 provisions, divided into eight categories, using Corporate Governance data from Institutional Shareholder Services/I.S.S. While Gompers et al. (2003) constructed the G-Index, Brown and Caylor (2004) created a summary index called "Gov-Score". Generally, every similar approach follows the 24 provisions of Gompers et al. (2003) . It is not surprising that plenty of studies have partly or totally used the G-Index testifying the negative effects of Corporate Governance provisions (Fahlenbrach, 2003; Klock, Mansi and Maxwell, 2003; Cremers, Nair and Wei, 2004; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Yermack, 2006 . Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2004) point out that only six are the provisions that actually are important in order to measure the quality level of Corporate Governance. Their index is called Entrenchment-Index. So, while Gompers et al. (2003) have used the G-Index with the 24 provisions, , as well as Johnson, Moorman and Sorescu (2005) have used the Entrenchment-Index with the six provisions. In total, we follow and gather six governance proxies divided into two categories: the "constitutional" provisions and the "takeover readiness" provisions. To be more specific, the first category ("constitutional" provisions) embraces four proxies: Staggered boards, Bylaws, Charter, and Supermajority. The second category ("takeover readiness" provisions) includes two governance proxies: Poison pills and Golden parachutes. All proxies are not legal required based on Greek laws but they are rather recommendations to managers.
All six proxies of Corporate Governance were embodied in a questionnaire that was sent out to all firms of the ASE. The General Index of the ASE enumerates five market segments: FTSE/XA 140, FTSE/XA SMALLCAP 80, FTSE/XA MID 40, FTSE/XA 20, and FTSE/XA INTERNATIONAL. A company can belong to more than one FTSE (market segment). As it is denoted in Table 1 , although the volume of individual firms is 253, we count a company that belongs to several FTSEs respective times. So, our relevant population increases to 350. The number of 304 firms shows the double or triple enlistments of the 253 listed on the ASE firms. Finally, our sample is the 253 individual firms enlisted on the ASE. We notice that some firms are enlisted to more than one FTSE. Our sample consists of 253 individual firms or else of 350 firms, if we count some of them more than one time due to double or triple enlistments. 
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The questionnaire was sent out to target firms in July 2006 and the last response was given to us at the end of September 2006. One restriction is the sample companies to be listed on the ASE at the time period of our research. Although institutional investors are less likely to invest in small cap firms, we cannot ignore small firms based on their market capitalization (size), because these investors put capital on firms, whose number is insufficient for any consideration let alone our analysis. We remind that quality of the implementation of Corporate Governance acts as a proxy for the monitoring costs of all investors. As Table 1 shows, the response of every market segment as well as the total response is more than 80% with the exception of firms of FTSE/XA 20 (65%), ignoring the multiple enlistments.
In order to measure the level of every firm's Corporate Governance, we replicate the method of constructing an index named Corporate Governance Quality Level (CGQL) with six scales or grades. We make the hypothesis that CGQL is a variable, which can measure risk. Every question of the set is a provision or else a limitation to shareholders rights. If a firm has this provision or limitation, one point is added to its total score. If the company does not have this provision, no point is added. As a rule, the more provisions a firm has, the higher score (CGQL) it gets. The relation is disproportional. So, the interpretation is straightforward and allows manageable explanations: if a company has an improved level of Corporate Governance, then a relatively small score will get in a seven-scale answering range 2 . The minimum score (zero) points out a firm with an exemplary quality of Corporate Governance, while the maximum score (six) indicates the opposite (total limitation of shareholder rights in favor of managers, directors, or/and members of Board of Directors). The CGQL consists of various variables and can act as a proxy for monitoring and other various costs. The less CGQL is, the less these costs. The hypothesis is that the provisions, which constitute CGQL for every single firm, can play the role of a proxy for the risk portion beyond covariance risk with a market index. As a result, we will try to transform differences of CGQL into perceived risk for shareholders.
As we said before, we use the six provisions to construct CGQL. In order to place it as variable, we quantify CGQL using the method of PC Analysis for every single question. We place one component and we extract a component score that is referred to the level of Corporate Governance quality. Firstly, we make a KMO Sphericity test for every Governance portfolio (Democracies and Dictatorships) in order to see if the variables (provisions) are correlated (Table 2a) . From this Table we figure that the variables are correlated. So, we can proceed to the PC Analysis. According to the KMO test, the null hypothesis is the covariance matrix of variables is proportional to the identity matrix. PC Analysis converts the correlated variables to uncorrelated. In Table 2b To measure the significance of the correlation between the CGQL and the expected rate of return on equity for the listed companies on the ASE, we should set a proxy for this return. We rely on two different financial measures as well as on a basic valuation ratio: a) historical stock returns (HSR), b) market capitalization (MAC), and c) book-to-market ratio (BTM) 3 . To measure the relationship of CGQL and expected rate of return, we insert these variables into a univariate analysis. Every single measure as well as its meaning is shown in section 3.2.
An introduction to Univariate Analysis: Correlations of Corporate Governance Quality Level (CGQL) and Financial Measures plus Valuation Ratios
Following Gompers et al. (2003) and Johnson et al. (2005) , we construct two portfolios with extreme values of CGQL. A "Democracy" portfolio consists of all firms, which are fully or almost fully complied with Corporate Governance rules, with CGQL 2. Contrary to the above, a "Dictatorship" portfolio is the set of companies with the poorest Corporate Governance quality and with CGQL  3. Tables 3a, 3b , 3c, 3d, and 3e exhibit results from univariate analysis between CGQLs and three control variables, that is HSR, MAC, and BTM (column 1). To be more specific , Tables 3a and 3b Johnson et al. (2005) . Furthermore, in columns 2 of Tables 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, and 3e is exhibited the correlation and the statistic significance of each independent variable (HSR, MAC, and BTM) with CGQL. All values are equally-weighted. No specific Corporate Governance regulation exists for particular market segments of the ASE. So, including all sample firms in our analysis when HSR is calculated does not meet any biases. HSR is the geometric mean of monthly stock returns of our sample period. Table 3e shows the correlation of CGQL with HSR for both Democracies and Dictatorships. T-statistics are reported in parentheses underneath the results of the coefficients.

For all measures of expected rate of return the correlation with CGQL is not statistically significant. As a result no secure conclusion can be drawn for fundamental financial and valuation characteristics of Democracies or for Dictatorships, since these characteristics do not seem to be adopted by firms with specific Corporate Governance quality levels.
In addition, the third and the fourth columns show the means for the variables of the first column as far as Democracies and Dictatorships are concerned respectively. Column 5 gives the means for each variable for all sample firms. In this section, the results point out that there is no tendency for fundamental financial and valuation characteristics to be adopted by firms with specific CGQL. Although these results are important and call into question Corporate Governance and its relation with expected returns, multiple variables need to enter regressions, in order to draw much more credible and robust conclusions. From the results of Tables 3a, 3b , 3c, 3d, and 3e we suspect that no disparate returns exist among listed firms on the ASE owe to their level of Corporate Governance. To begin with, in order to confirm or to exclude alike assumptions, we run the threefactor model of Fama and French (1993) for the sample period (years 2004, 2005) trying to capture any speculative differences between Democracies' and Dictatorships' returns, examining at the same time if the returns of enlisted companies on the ASE are normal or not, as well as the factors -including Corporate Governance -which generate abnormal (if any) returns. A vast amount of empirical research indicates that market risk (beta) by itself 5 is inadequate in explaining the expected returns and that other factors such as market capitalization (size) (Fama and French, 1993) , book-to-market ratio (Fama and French, 1993) , immediate past stock returns (momentum) (Fama and French, 1993) , as well as other measures (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) can sufficiently and significantly explain cross-section returns. We examine if the Greek capital market is efficient as well as if any control variable stand for proxies of systematic risk. Our hypothesis is that at least one control variable (size, book-to-market ratio or market risk) causes at least partly the (if any) differences in the stock returns between Democracies and Dictatorships. Using the O.L.S. Method, we compute the following model:
Corporate Governance and Risk Factors

Governance Portfolios' Returns and the Three-Factor Model
Where:
is the difference between the returns of the Democracy portfolio and the Dictatorship portfolio in month t. All returns are value-weighted using market capitalization. This method is preferable, because al value-weighted components contribute to the variance minimisation, particularly when returns' variances are negatively correlated with total market capitalization (Fama and French, 1993) . Intercept coefficient (a) controls for abnormal returns of the market on an investment strategy that buys Democracies and sells short Dictatorships. The sample period is extended from January 1, 2004 to January 1, 2006. As far as variables are concerned, is the return difference for every month between Democracy portfolio's returns and Dictatorship portfolio's returns. Variable denotes the monthly difference between the return of the General Index of ASE ( ) and the return of a risk-free 3-year Greek bond ( ). Then, we compute and according to Fama and French (1993) , Gompers et al. (2003) as well as Johnson et al. (2005) . denotes the monthly return difference between a portfolio that constitutes of big size firms and a portfolio which constitutes of small size companies.
constitutes the monthly return difference between a portfolio that constitutes of high book-to-market (BTM) firms and a portfolio which constitutes of low book-to-market (BTM) companies. Median is used for these portfolio separations. Table 4 gives the regression results of the three-factor model of equation (2). Table 4 , intercept "a" is statistically significant at the 10% level, rejecting the CAPM. This indicates that the ASE is not an efficient market confirming the results of other researches in Greece (Kavussanos and Dockery, 2001) . Furthermore, alpha is positive, which indicates that Democracies tend to gain larger abnormal returns than Dictatorships. The regression results show that the coefficient of enters with a negative sign at the 1% level of significance. Variable is not significant. Taken into account the results from Tables 3a, 3b, can be explained by the book-to-market ratio but only partly, because the intercept is not equal to zero. Following Gompers et al. (2003) , alpha is 1.48 that equals to 148 basis points per month, or to 17.76% yearly. Corporate Governance, as it is measured by CGQL, is not able to create abnormal returns. As a result, other factors (differences in firm value as value is expressed through book-to-market ratios) are responsible for making Greek stock market inefficient. T-statistics are reported in parentheses underneath the results of the coefficients. While we found abnormal returns through the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) , it is essential to use a second model that measures the volume of these returns as well as to try to detect if CGQL acts as a risk proxy for the volume of abnormal returns. Also, in this analysis we make use of a fundamental factor that may determine, at least partly, this range of abnormal returns in favor of Democracies. Our multi-variate analysis continues after controlling for abnormal returns in the ASE. In this subsection we use the procedure of Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) to measure the volume of these returns and we will K. Toudas -A. Bellas seek to find a relationship not only with CGQL but also with a valuation ratio named Tobin's Q for every Governance portfolio.
As we mention above, the statistically significant alpha indicates that the control variables of the Fama and French (1993) model cannot be interpreted as the only proxies of risk factors. So, let alone the variables of the three-factor model, they do exist other factors that cause stock returns shifts. As it is already known, firm value can be measured using the Tobin's Q ratio. It is the ratio of a firm's market value via the replacement cost of its assets (Tobin and Brainard, 1968 ). Tobin's Q ratio is vastly used the last decades as a measure of performance (Thomadakis, 1977; Lindenberg and Ross, 1981; Salinger, 1984; Smirlock, Gilligan and Marshall, 1984; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Lang, Stulz and Walkling, 1989; Servaes, 1991; Hanson and Song, 1996; Gompers et al., 2003; Black et al., 2003) . Abnormal returns are created, if a company is valued more than the cost that would have been necessary as a requirement in order to be rebuilt.
In many cases, so as in ours, another approach of Tobin's Q ratio is adopted, due to the fact that the calculation of the preliminary form of this complex ratio bears difficulties. Chung and Pruitt (1994) as well as Perfect and Wiles (1994) developed a form of Tobin's Q named Approximate Tobin's Q. Due to its simplicity and accuracy (only basic and published financial and accounting factors) it is widely used. Actually, Tobin's Q of company i in time period t is the vulgar fraction with nominator the sum of stock market value as well as short-and long-term liabilities, and with denominator the book value of total assets all in time period t. To begin with, we calculate for the sample period monthly BHARs for these two Governance portfolios, following Barber and Lyon (1997) as well as Alexandrou and Sudarsanam (2001) . The monthly return of the General Index of the ASE is used as the expected return-as the benchmark (Thalassinos and Politis, 2011) . .
Using a linear regression model, we test if Tobin's Q as well as CGQL can cause a shift to abnormal returns. To be more exact, our hypothesis is that firm value, as it is measured by Tobin's Q ratio, indicates another meaningful risk factor for Democracies as well as for Dictatorships, by causing statistically significant changes of stock returns. We compute annually Tobin's Q ratios (TQRs) and BHARs for every firm i. Specifically, to account for and confirm our hypotheses, we estimate the following regression for every sample year (years 2004, 2005) and for every Governance portfolio: It is shown clearly that Corporate Governance is a factor that neither increases nor decreases abnormal returns. The volume of these returns that characterize the ASE as an inefficient capital market can be explained sufficiently through a financial ratio such as Tobin's Q. *** Significant at the 1% level ** Significant at the 5% level * Significant at the 10% level 
Corporate Governance Quality Level (CGQL) and Expected Return on Equity as expressed by Geometric Means of Historical Stock Returns
In this section, we measure the relationship between CGQL and expected rate of return. It is assumed that historical stock returns [ iT r of equation (1)] are sufficient proxies for expected rates of return (Drobetz et al., 2004) . Because the market is imperfect, agency and various other costs exist, making the expected returns on equity to include risk that is not related to the stock's beta.
In this section we adopt an alternative approach. Our goal is to examine if the level of the quality implementation of Corporate Governance, as expressed by variable CGQL, can account for the stock returns' differences against market beta. If there is a significant correlation between CGQL and expected returns in a cross-section of firms, then beta is not the only risk factor that determines the price performance of listed firms in the ASE.
Our rationale is rather simple and straightforward 7 : if no agency costs existed, then the CAPM would not be rejected and the market of the ASE would be efficient. However, as we have already shown, the world of the ASE (and generally of almost every single capital market) is conquered by agency costs. According to the agency theory, Dictatorships should experience higher returns, as compensation to investors for paying associated costs (agency, auditing, and monitoring costs). The sample period ranges from January 1, 2004 to January 1, 2006.
Firstly, we estimate the betas of companies using monthly stock returns and the monthly return of the General Index of the ASE as market return. Secondly, we estimate the equation (1) for every Governance portfolio. Contrast to the agency theory, we hypothesize that the level of Corporate Governance, as expressed through variable CGQL, will be positively related to the returns on equity. Regression results are shown in Table 7 . Again, t-statistics are reported in parentheses underneath the results of the coefficients. Our hypothesis does not hold for any of the regressions. Columns 1 of Tables 7a and 7b underline the value of coefficient, its significance level, and t-statistics if the only independent variable in equation (1) is the firms' betas. In other words, in columns 1 we find the results of the CAPM. In columns 2 of Tables 7a and 7b we introduce CGQL variable of equation (1) excluding betas.
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As far as Democracies are concerned, beta in column 1 enters with a negative coefficient, although it tends to zero, not in line with the theoretical predictions 8 . In addition, in a univariate analysis beta is significant at the 5% level.
In column 2 a univariate analysis with CGQL follows. As it is directly observed, the explanatory power of CGQL is rather inexistent. Finally, in column 3 we control for systematic risk. The null hypothesis that 0 2   is acceptable due to the insignificance of CGQL's coefficient. As far as Dictatorship portfolio is concerned, we actually draw the same conclusions. This indicates that an adoption of a high quality Corporate Governance code by the enlisted companies on the ASE does not lead to higher returns on equity. It seems that investors do not value the lower costs of monitoring and auditing when they invest on stocks. 
Conclusions
Corporate Governance in Greece has attracted some attention in the last years. Researches in foreign capital markets have shown that investors are willing to pay a premium for a company with high quality of Corporate Governance compared to another identical company but with a poor quality of Corporate Governance, as well as, firm value is specified not only by financial factors but also by the quality of Corporate Governance. In our study, we stress that the only plausible variables are the six provisions have pointed out, in order to build reliable conclusions between Corporate Governance and other factors. Again, we underline that all selected proxies are not legal required based on Greek laws but they are rather recommendations to managers. Our results do not show any existence of significant differences between Democracies and Dictatorships.
The answer to all the questions that concern us throughout our research is alike. Corporate Governance cannot create nor control abnormal returns between the listed firms on the ASE. To raise the point differently, Corporate Governance does not matter from an asset pricing perspective and it cannot be regarded as an additional risk factor for investors. Furthermore, Corporate Governance cannot be a "substitute" for market risk (beta). Listed firms on the ASE must find another way to increase their perceived valuation. The Greek capital market can be characterized as a rather traditional market that does not keep pace with the evolution and the use of non-quantified measures of firm attractiveness. This can be interpreted by the fact that investors in Greece are rather passive in monitoring and disciplining incumbent
